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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(j) and Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Although the structure of Bahnmaier' s opening brief indicates that she is

•

presenting only two issues for review, she actually presents a number of claims of alleged
error by the district court. 1 They are outlined below.
1.

Bahnmaier alleges that Northern Utah Healthcare Corporation, dba

St. Mark's Hospital (the "Hospital") violated its for-cause termination policy, which she
claims fonned an express contract. 2 Did the district court err in granting summary
judgment on Bahnmaier' s express contract claim, when it is undisputed that the Hospital
based its employment termination decision on two independent reports that Bahnmaier
had admitted to a violation of the Hospital's Substance Use in the Workplace Policy (the

•

"Substance Use Policy")?
2.

Bahnmaier alleges that when the Hospital did not administer a drug test, it

violated its Substance Use Policy, which she claims formed an implied-in-fact contract.
Did the district court err in granting summary judgment on Bahnmaier's implied-in-fact
contract claim, when the Hospital indisputably disclaimed contractual liability for its

I Bahnmaier does not assign any error to the district court's grant of summary judgment
on her claim for alleged breach of the implied-in-law covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. Thus, as described below, the district court's dismissal of this claim should be
affinned.

"Cause" under this policy requires only a reasonable belief in a basis for termination
that is not arbitrary, capricious, or illegal.

2
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personnel policies and the Substance Use Policy does not require drug testing in any
event?
3.

Bahnmaier alleges that the Defendants acted negligently when her

employment was discharged. Did the district court err in granting summary judgment on
<i>

Bahnmaier' s negligence claim because this claim is barred by the economic loss rule,
when it is undisputed that the Defendants do not owe Bahnmaier any duties independent
of alleged contracts and when Bahnmaier has not alleged property damage or bodily
harm?
4.

Bahnmaier alleges that she was defamed by Renel Rytting (her former

supervisor) when Rytting reported to her manager that Bahnmaier was intoxicated at
work.

Did the district court err in granting summary judgment on Bahnmaier' s

defamation claim against Rytting because Bahnmaier did not overcome the qualified
@

privilege, when Bahnmaier' s sole attempt to overcome this privilege to the district court
was to challenge the adequacy of Rytting's investigation? 3
5.

Bahnmaier alleges that the Defendants interfered with her economic

relationships by defaming her. Because Bahnmaier' s interference claim is predicated on
her defamation claim, did the district court err when it also granted summary judgment
on this dependent claim?

3

~

As described below, under Utah law, a plaintiff may not overcome the qualified
privilege by attacking the adequacy of an investigation conducted by the publisher of an
alleged defamatory statement.
2
1239317.2

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
An appellate court reviews "a district court's decision to grant summary judgment

for correctness, giving no deference to the district court. [Such] review is limited to
determining whether the district court correctly applied the summary judgment standard
in light of the undisputed material facts." Raab v. Utah Ry. Co., 2009 UT 61,, 10, 221
P.3d 219, 223. An appellate court may affirm an order appealed from "'on any legal
ground or theory apparent on the record,' even if it 'differs from that stated by the trial
court."' Osguthorpe v. Wolf Mountain Resorts, LC, 2010 UT 29,

il 10, 232 P.3d 999

(quoting First Equity Fed., Inc. v. Phillips Dev., LC, 2002 UT 56, iJ 11, 52 P.3d 1137).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

During the times relevant to this dispute, Bahnmaier was employed by the
Hospital as a Surgical Technician on the Cardiovascular Heart Surgery Team. ROO 10.
On April 10, 2012, Bahnmaier's employment was terminated by her manager, Corbie
Peterson, for violating the Hospital's Substance Use Policy. In reaching this decision,
Peterson had received and relied upon two independent reports-one from Bahnmaier' s
direct supervisor (Renel Rytting) and one from a Human Resources employee at an
affiliated hospital (Kelly Brimhall)-that Bahnmaier had acknowledged being under the
influence of alcohol on March 29, 2012 while she was at work. R0292-97. This was the
second time in ten months that Peterson had disciplined Bahnmaier for a violation of the
Hospital's Substance Use Policy.

R0291.

Peterson wrote in her April 10, 2012,

termination memorandum "this is the second event within a year when you have been

3
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•

unable to fulfill your job responsibilities. Your lack of judgment, by coming to work in
an intoxicated state, could have placed our patients in an unsafe situation." R0297.
On February 6, 2014, Bahnmaier filed this lawsuit against the Hospital, her
supervisor Rytting (who had told Peterson that Bahnmaier had admitted that she would
<il

have failed a drug test on March 29, 2012), and Hospital Corporation of America
("HCA"), the Hospital's ultimate parent corporation.

R000l-8.

On April 25, 2014,

Bahnmaier filed an amended Complaint against the Hospital, Rytting, and HCA and
alleged claims of negligence, defamation, interference with economic relations, breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and breach of contract. R0009-17.
On July 9, 2015, the Hospital and Rytting filed a Motion for Summary Judgment
seeking a dismissal of the Amended Complaint and all the claims asserted against them.
R0208-10. The Hospital and Rytting argued that Bahnmaier's negligence claim was
barred by the economic loss rule. R0224-25, 0930-31. The Hospital and Rytting also
argued that the defamation claim was barred because Bahnmaier could not overcome the
qualified privilege that indisputably attaches to the statements at issue in this case.
R0225-27, 0931-34. Moreover, the Hospital and Rytting argued that the interference
claim was barred because Bahnmaier could not establish improper means (i.e., that this
claim rises and falls on the merits of the defamation claim). R0227-28, 0934.
With respect to the claims asserted solely against the Hospital and HCA, the
Hospital explained that the express contract claim, arising from its "for cause"
termination policy, only requires that the Hospital terminate employment based on a
reason that is not arbitrary, capricious, or illegal that the Hospital reasonably believes to
4
1239317.2
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be true. The Hospital argued that this claim must be dismissed because it is undisputed
that Peterson (the decision-maker) reasonably believed that Bahnmaier had violated the

•

Hospital's Substance Use Policy, notably because this decision-maker had received two
independent reports that Bahnmaier had admitted to being under the influence of alcohol
at work. R0229-32, 0935-37. Furthermore, the Hospital argued that the implied-in-fact
contract claim based on the Hospital's Substance Use Policy was barred because this
policy is not a contract, based on a number of contract disclaimers. The Hospital also
argued that the policy, which on its face does not require drug testing, was not breached.
R0232-33, 0937-38.

Finally, the Hospital argued that Bahnmaier's implied-in-law

covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim fails because this claim is duplicative of the
express and implied-in-fact contract claims (which also fail). 4 R0229, 0934-35.
On July 9, 2015, HCA also filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, joining in the
arguments made by the Hospital and Rytting, and seeking dismissal on the independent
ground that it has no joint-employer liability (Bahnmaier' s sole theory of liability against
HCA). R0466-86. Bahnmaier opposed both Motions for Summary Judgment and a
hearing was held before the district court on November 17, 2015. R0510-32, 0766-0804,
1081-1161.
'ii

The Hospital also argued that the implied-in-law covenant of good faith and fair dealing
claim fails because Bahnmaier remained an at-will employee, notwithstanding the "for
cause" termination policy, because her employment was always for an indefinite term.
R0228-29. This issue was not addressed in the Court's order and is not raised by the
Hospital now on appeal. Again, as already explained above at pages 5-6, Bahnmaier has
waived any issue associated with the district court's dismissal of the implied-in-law
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

4

5
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At the conclusion of the November 17, 2015, hearing, the district court granted
both Motions for Summary Judgment.

R1141.

The court found that Bahnmaier's

negligence claim was barred by the economic loss rule because "Plaintiff has not asserted
a claim based on an independent duty from the contractual duties that are set forth in this
fi

case." Rl 142. With respect to the defamation claim, the court found that Bahnmaier had
"failed to meet her burden that the defendant abused the [qualified] privilege . . . ." Id.
In so holding, the court observed that "importantly, [Bahnmaier] admits in her testimony
that she could have made a remark giving Ms. Rytting the impression that she would fail
the drug test." Id. The court also held that the concerns Bahnmaier raised about the
adequacy of the Hospital's and Rytting's investigation do "not satisfy the standard of
abuse to overcome the privilege." Id. The court dismissed the interference claim because
"both sides agree that to the extent the defamation claim fails so that claim fails also."

(:j

Rl 142-43.
With respect to the claims asserted against the Hospital and HCA only, the Court
held that the express contract claim for alleged breach of the for-cause termination policy
should be dismissed "based on the undisputed facts, including independent reports from
Ms. Rytting and Mr. Brimhall ... that Ms. Peterson reasonably believed that plaintiff had
violated the Substance Use Policy and that that action was not illegal, arbitrary· or
capricious." R1143. With respect to the implied-in-fact contract claim based on the
Hospital's Substance Use Policy, the court held that the Hospital "adequately disclaimed
contractual liability for the substance abuse policy in the two writings signed by the
Plaintiff." RI 144. The court held, in the alternative, that any implied-in-fact contract
6
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claim based on the fact that Bahnmaier was not drug-tested must be dismissed because
"testing was permissive and not mandatory" under the Hospital's policy. Id.
Finally, the court dismissed the claim for breach of the implied-in-law covenant of
good faith and fair dealing because it was identical to the express and implied-in-fact
contract claims and there was compliance with these alleged contracts. RI 143. The
court also stated that it had granted HCA's separate Motion for Summary Judgment on
the alternative ground that HCA did not jointly employ Bahnmaier and, as a result, had
no liability to her. RI 144-45.
On December 28, 2015, the district court entered its written Order Granting
Motion for Summary Judgment (the "Order") filed by the Hospital and Rytting that
tracks the oral ruling announced at the November 15, 2015, hearing. See Order,

,r,r 20-

39. The district court also entered a separate written Order granting the Motion for
Summary Judgment filed by HCA.
On January 26, 2016, Bahnmaier filed her Notice of Appeal from the district
court's December 28, 2015, Order granting the Hospital's and Rytting's Motion for
Summary Judgment. Bahnmaier did not appeal from the Order granting HCA's Motion
for Summary Judgment.
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS

Balmmaier is hired by the Hospital, receives its policies, and enters into
an Employment Agreement that requires "cause" for employment
termination, but disclaims contractual liability for all other policies.
I.

Bahnmaier was hired by the Hospital on July 11, 2005, as an operating

room technician. R0245, 0302-03, 0413.
7
12393 I 7.2
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~

2.

The following contract disclaimer appears, in all capital letters, on the

employment application signed by Bahnmaier in 2005:
"I UNDERSTAND AND AGREE THAT ANY EMPLOYEE
HANDBOOK WHICH I MAY RECEIVE WILL NOT CONSTITUTE AN
EMPLOYNIENT CONTRACT, BUT WILL BE MERELY A
GRATUITOUS STATEMENT OF FACILITY POLICIES."
i)

R0245.
3.
~

Sometime between Bahnmaier's hiring in July of 2005 and February of

2007, the Hospital adopted a "for cause" employment termination policy. R0266-67.
4.

The Hospital's "for cause" employment termination policy states as

follows: "Cause is defined as a reason for disciplinary action that is not arbitrary,
®

capricious, or illegal, that is based on facts that the employer reasonably believes to be
true. Some examples of cause include, but are not limited to, ( 1) dissatisfaction with an
employee for such reasons as lack of capacity or diligence, failure to conform to usual
standards of conduct, or other culpable or inappropriate behavior, or (2) economic needs
subject to the reasonable judgment of the employer." R0258.

5.

On March 1, 2007, in conjunction with a retention bonus paid to her by the

Hospital, Bahnmaier signed a Retention Bonus Agreement which states: "It is understood
that all employment, including EMPLOYEE'S employment, with HOSPITAL is for an
indefinite term and is terminable for cause. Cause is defined as a reason for disciplinary
action that is not arbitrary, capricious, or illegal, that is based on facts that the employer
reasonably believes to be true." R0266-67.

8
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6.

The Retention Bonus Agreement also contains the following contract

disclaimer: "Nothing in this Agreement will be construed to obligate HOSPITAL to

9

employ EMPLOYEE for any particular time or under any particular terms or conditions
of employment." Id.
7.

In June of 2008 the Hospital created a dedicated Cardiovascular Heart

Surgery Team (the "Heart Team") to handle all heart surgeries whether scheduled or
unplanned emergency situations. Bahnmaier accepted a position as a member of this
Heart Team and signed a Cardiovascular Technician Employee Agreement. R0250-5 l,
0269-71, 0773.
8.

Bahnmaier's Employment Agreement provides: "It is understood that all

employment, including EMPLOYEE'S employment, with HOSPITAL is for an indefinite
term and is terminable for cause. Cause is defined as a reason for disciplinary action that
is not arbitrary, capricious, or illegal, that is based on facts that the employer reasonably
believes to be true." R0269-71.
9.

The Employment Agreement also contains the following disclaimer:

"Nothing in this Agreement will be construed to obligate HOSPITAL to employ
EMPLOYEE for any particular time or under any particular terms or conditions of
employment." Id.
10.

As a member of the Heart Team, Bahnmaier was required to accept rotating

assignments to be on call for emergencies. When Heart Team employees are scheduled
to be on-call they had to be ready, willing and able to report to work at any time fully

9
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capable of performing all work functions associated with a heart surgery case, and free of
the influence of any alcohol or drugs. R0276-77, 0288, 0310 (42:5-10), 0773-74.
11.

The Hospital has a longstanding Substance Use Policy which is intended

"to prohibit inappropriate drug or alcohol use by our employees and ... to prevent a
threat to the quality of care we provide to patients, the safety of our workplace and a
healthy work environment." R0275, 0774. On June 16, 2005, Bahnmaier certified that
she had read and understood this policy. R0273, 0774.
12.

The Substance Use Policy requires an employee to "notify his or her

supervisor if the employee has reasonable concerns that another employee has violated
this policy." R0277.
13.

The Substance Use Policy also prohibits employees from "reporting to

work, or being at work, while under the influence of or while impaired by alcohol,
alcoholic beverages, illegal substances, prescribed or non-prescribed controlled
substances." R0276.
14.

The Substance Use Policy provides the procedures that should be

implemented in the event a drug test is administered (R0278-79), but the policy does not
contain any requirement that drug testing be used in all circumstances of suspected drug
or alcohol use (e.g., when an employee admits to being under the influence of alcohol).
R0275-82.
15.

The Hospital's Code of Conduct likewise states that the Hospital's

employees "must report for work free of the influence of alcohol and illegal drugs.
Reporting to work under the influence of any illegal drug or alcohol ... may result in
10
1239317.2
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immediate termination." R0288. On July 11, 2005, Bahnmaier certified that she had
received the Code of Conduct. R0256, 0771-72.
16.

The Code of Conduct also expressly instructs that drug testing is

permissive: "We may use drug testing as a means of enforcing this policy." R0288
(emphasis added).
Bahnmaier receives a written warning for her first violation of the
Substance Use Policy.
17.

On May 26, 2011, the Executive Director of Surgical Services, Corbie

Petersen, issued Bahnmaier a Written Warning for her first violation of the Substance
Use Policy. Peterson wrote that Bahnmaier "was on call for [an affiliate, Timpanogos
Hospital] on Saturday, May 7th and was deemed unable to work by her co-workers due to
intoxication. Her call was covered by a co-worker. This behavior is unprofessional and
harmful to our patients." Bahnmaier was "given a brochure for EAP" and told that
"further events will result in additional disciplinary action up to and including
termination." R0249, 0291, 0775.
18.

Bahnmaier was not drug tested in connection with this incident. R03 l 3-14

(55:23 to 56:14, 60:3-5), 0412 (30:16-20), 0775-76.
19.

Bahnmaier signed the May 26, 2011 Written Warning, did not make any

comments in the Employee Comment section in the Written Warning, and took no steps
to challenge the Written Warning while she was employed. R0291, 0314 (58:20-22),
0417 (51:13-17), 0775-76.

11
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•

Bahnmaier violates the Substance Use Policy a second time and her
employment is terminated.
20.

Less than a year after the first warning, on March 29, 2012, Bahnmaier

agreed to cover an on-call shift originally assigned to one of her co-workers.

An

unscheduled emergency open heart surgery case arose requiring the Hospital to call in the
Heart Team members who were on-call that day. Bahnmaier reported to the Hospital at
approximately 7:00 pm that evening to fill the call-in and work as part of the surgical
team on the open heart surgery. R0315-l 7 (61 :6 to 63:14, 68:25 to 69:2), 0293, 0295,
0776.
21.
i>

When Bahnmaier arrived for work that evening her direct supervisor, Renel

Rytting, observed that Bahnmaier's "eyes looked glazed and dilated and she had dark
makeup smeared under her eyes." Rytting "felt [Bahnmaier] was under the influence of
some substance." 5 R0293, 0392-93 (124:21-25, 125:10-19), 0315-16 (64:24 to 65:12).
22.

Rytting also received a report that evening from one of Bahnmaier's

coworkers that Bahnmaier appeared to be under the influence of alcohol. This coworker
tiD

reported to Rytting that Bahnmaier' s behavior was odd, she was red in the face, she was
very emotional and was having a difficult time. He questioned Bahnmaier' s ability to
perform the tasks associated with her job on the pending heart surgery case and felt that

@

•

5

Bahnmaier admitted that she had been crying, that her makeup was smeared, and that
she "became red-eyed" on March 29, 2012. R0776. Nevertheless, Bahnmaier attempted
to dispute that she appeared to be under the influence of alcohol because another
coworker observed her that night and did not "believe she was drunk." R077 6-77.
However, Rytting's belief that Bahnmaier appeared to be under the influence only
provides context to explain why Rytting met with Bahnmaier on March 29, 2012, and
questioned Bahnmaier about her sobriety that evening. Thus, there is no material dispute
about whether Rytting "felt [Bahnmaier] was under the influence of some substance."
12
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Bahnmaier's behavior was similar to the conduct he had observed from her during offduty social gatherings where she had been drinking alcohol. R0451-52, 0777.
23.

On March 29, 2012, after hearing this coworker's report, and based on her

own observations, Rytting called Bahnmaier into a private office where Rytting asked
Bahnmaier if she was sober. R0293, 0394 (129:3-9).
24.

Throughout this conversation in Rytting's office, Bahnmaier kept her

surgical mask in place covering her nose and mouth and was chewing tobacco. R0318
(74:5-25), 0394 (130:17-18, 131:10-16).
25.

During this conversation, Bahnmaier was given the option of taking a drug

test or going home. R0293, 0394 (132:6-23). Rytting would later report to her manager,
Peterson, that Bahnmaier responded, "I won't pass the test, I know I won't" and that
Rytting replied, "I didn't think so. Now go home." R0293.
26.

Bahnmaier admits that she "could" have made a statement during this

conversation that gave Rytting the impression that Bahnmaier would have failed a drug
test. As a result, Bahnmaier was sent home. Bahnmaier's testimony on this subject is as
follows:
Q.
After [Rytting] makes the statement about giving you the option [to
take a drug test or go home], then [Rytting] goes on to say that Candy
replied, "I won't pass the test, I know I won't." Do you remember saying
that to her?
A.

No, I don't.

Q.

. .. [D]o you disagree with that ... ?

A.
I just know that either - I know I didn't say that, because there was
no reason for me not to. And I am - if you get to know me, I'm a big
13
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smart a/eek so it could ltave been one of tltose, so I apologize. I could
have been - that could be sometlting misleading but I did not - I did not
say that ... in those intentions of feeling like I was guilty or something,
because I was not guilty, I knew - I know that.
Q.
So you could have said something to her that gave her that
impression?
A.
And if I did give her that impression, then in a professional and a
management role, then you go down and test. If there's any suspicion, you
do it. But that was not taken.
Q
Okay. So if I understand you correctly, you could have made a
comment to [Rytting] that would have given her the impression that you
said, "I won't pass the test." You could have said something like that?
A.

I could - I could - I don't recall the conversation.

Q.
Okay. And your concern is that when that comment was made that
gave her that impression, she should have sent you down for a test?
A.

Correct.

Q.
But, in fact, as [Rytting] goes on to say, she says, "I didn't think so;
now go home."

A.

Right.

Q.

Do you remember her saying that to you? ....

A.
Right, and she - and that's what she said. You know, that's what
she said .... [S]he is, like, "You know what? I didn't think so. Why don't
you go home. I'll tell the - I'll tell the crew you didn't feel good." And
that's what happened. I went - and then I went home.
R0320 (81 :10 to 83:12) (emphasis added).
2 7.

In

accordance

with

Hospital

policy

and

professional

licensing

responsibilities, Rytting reported the incident to her manager, Petersen, who was
responsible for all employment-related decisions for the Department as well as to the
S

Human Resources Manager Brian Wood. Rytting shared the details of the matter with no

14
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one other than Petersen and Wood.

R0293, 0375 (55:5-18), 0331 (126:7-24), 0335

(143:21 to 144:25), 0395-96 (134:14-18, 138:12-14).
28.

®

Petersen reported the incident to Robyn Opheikens and Brian Wood in the

Hospital's Human Resources Department. Petersen shared the details of the matter with
no one other than these members of the Human Resources Department. R0420 (62: 1116), 0779.
29.

Robyn Opheikens contacted Kelly Brimhall, the Human Resource Director

at Timpanogos Regional Hospital (an affiliated hospital), where Bahnmaier was working
the following day. Opheikens asked Brimhall to have Bahnmaier submit to a drug test
but did not explain the reason why or the circumstances involved. Although Brimhall
had never before met Bahnmaier, he did arrange with her to facilitate the drug test which
was administered to Bahnmaier by a third party at approximately 6:00 p.m. on Friday,
March 30, 2012. R0295, 0441 (50:20 to 51 :25), 0454-55, 0779.
30.

While waiting for the drug testing company to arrive, Brimhall and

Bahnmaier engaged in conversation. Brimhall summarized that conversation in an email
to Opheikens the following Tuesday, April 3, 2012, reporting that Bahnmaier had
admitted to him that she had come to work drunk on March 29, 2012.

Specifically,

Brimhall wrote that during that conversation, Bahnmaier "indicated that she was not
originally on-call the previous night, Thursday [March 29, 2012], but a co-worker called
her and asked that she take his/her call for the evening. She agreed, but admitted that by
then, she was drunk. During the same evening, she admitted to being called in for a case

15
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and showing up drunk to the case and having her supervisor realize that she was drunk
and sent her home without allowing her to work." R0295, 0454-55.
31.

Bahnmaier never disputed the material part of Brimhall' s report: that he

sent it to Peterson, and that Peterson believed it and relied on it when she terminated
(t)

Bahnmaier's employment (the primary issue in this case is whether Peterson-the
decision-maker-reasonably believed that a policy violation occurred, not whether
Brimhall held such a belief). Instead, Bahnmaier attempted to dispute that she actually

(i)

told Brimhall she was drunk. R0780. But at her deposition, Bahnmaier testified that
while she was sure she had a conversation with Brimhall, she could not remember this
conversation "at all."

R0321 (88:1-8), 0356 (227:2-4).

Indeed, when asked if she

thought Brimhall had lied when he reported Bahnmaier' s admission to being drunk,
Bahnmaier replied, "I am not going to say he's lying or not. To be honest, I don't recall
Gt

the conversation. I don't." R03 23 (9 5: 14-23).
32.

Peterson, as the Department Director, was responsible for making the

decision as to what to do about this incident with Bahnmaier. R0457-58.
33.

Petersen was the same individual who had issued Bahnmaier a written

warning ten months earlier for a violation of the Substance Use Policy. (Fact Nos. 17-19,
above.) Petersen was disappointed and saddened that Bahnmaier had failed to improve
and that Bahnmaier had exhibited poor judgment that had endangered Hospital patients.
R0297, 0458.

16
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34.

On April 10, 2012, in light of the pnor Written Warning, and the

independent reports she received from Rytting and Brimhall (and believed to be true),
Petersen terminated Bahnmaier's employment with St. Mark's Hospital. R0297, 0458.
35.

In Peterson's written termination notice provided to Bahnmaier, which

summarizes the information provided by Rytting and Brimhall, Peterson observed that
"this is the second reported event within a year when you have been unable to fulfill your
job responsibilities. Your lack of judgment, by coming to work in an intoxicated state,
could have placed our patients in an unsafe situation. Co-workers have had to re-arrange
their schedule due to your lack of professionalism." R0297.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Bahnmaier' s employment at the Hospital was terminated for cause because her
manager, Peterson, reasonably believed Bahnmaier violated a Substance Use Policy by
coming to work under the influence of alcohol on March 29, 2012. Peterson had received
independent reports from Bahnmaier' s direct supervisor (Rytting) and a Human
Resources employee (Brimhall) that Rytting had admitted to being under the influence of
alcohol at work. In fact, Bahnmaier admits that she "could" have made a "smart aleck"
remark that gave Rytting the impression that she would fail a drug test.

Moreover,

Bahnmaier will not say that Brimhall lied about what he reported nor does she even recall
what she said to him.
This was Bahnmaier's second violation of the Substance Use Policy (her prior
violation was just ten months prior and resulted in a warning). Thus, on April 10, 2012,
in reliance on the separate reports she had received from Rytting and Brimhall, and
17
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~

motivated by a desire to protect the safety of Hospital patients, Peterson terminated
Bahnmaier's employment. Based on these undisputed facts, including Bahnmaier's own
admissions, the claims asserted by Bahnmaier arising from the termination of her
employment fail and were correctly dismissed by the court below.
First, Bahnmaier challenges the district court's dismissal of her claim for breach of
an express contract based on the Hospital's for-cause termination policy, which she says
was violated when her employment was terminated. "Cause" under the Hospital's policy
(i)

has a broad definition: it requires only that the decision-maker have a reasonable belief in
a basis for termination that is not arbitrary, capricious, or illegal. Bahnmaier did not
come forward with facts calling Peterson's reasonable belief into question. Instead, the
thrust of Bahnmaier' s argument is that the only possible way for Peterson to reasonably
believe that a policy violation had occurred was to drug test Bahnmaier. Bahnmaier
(i)

ignores that Peterson had received two reliable reports that Bahnmaier had admitted to
being under the influence of alcohol at work. A hospital does not act unreasonably or
arbitrarily when, based on such reliable information, it acts in the interest of its heart
surgery patients to protect them from technicians who have admitted to coming to work
under the influence. of alcohol. Thus, the district court correctly held that Bahnmaier' s
claim for alleged breach of an express contract must be dismissed because the Hospital
did not violate its for-cause termination policy.
Second, Bahnmaier challenges the district court's dismissal of her implied-in-fact
contract claim based on the Hospital's Substance Us~ Policy, which she says required and
mandated that the Hospital drug test her prior to terminating her employment. However,
18
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except for the for-cause termination policy, the Hospital expressly disclaimed contractual
liability for all other personnel policies.

Clear and conspicuous contract disclaimers

9

appear in Bahnmaier's employment application and in two subsequent employment
agreements. Thus, the Substance Use Policy does not form a contract. Even if the
Substance Use Policy had formed a contract, this policy does not require drug testing. To
the contrary, it says the Hospital "may" test; the Hospital's policy statements expressly
instruct employees that drug testing is permissive and not mandatory. Thus, the district
court correctly held that the Substance Use Policy does not form a contract and was not
violated even if it did create an implied-in-fact contract.
Bahnmaier also brought a claim against the Hospital for alleged breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The district court dismissed this claim
because it asserts rights identical to her alleged contract claims and because the impliedin-law covenant cannot be contrary to the express terms of the parties' agreement.
Bahnmaier does not address or assign error to the district court's dismissal of this claim,
which should be affirmed.
Third, Bahnmaier challenges the district court's dismissal of her negligence claim,
which the district court held was barred by the economic loss rule. Bahnmaier alleges
that the Defendants' violated a duty to drug test her and a duty to terminate her
employment only for cause-duties which arise solely from her alleged contracts with the
Hospital. Bahnmaier has not alleged any property damage or bodily injury. Thus, the
economic loss rule plainly bars Bahnmaier' s negligence claim. Nevertheless, Bahnmaier
argues that the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Cabaness v. Thomas creates an
19
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exception to the economic loss rule in employment cases where a plaintiff alleges
emotional distress.

But in Cabaness, the Supreme Court did not even mention the

economic loss rule, and for good reason-the Court was addressing claims for implied
contract and for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The economic loss rule does
GI

not apply to contract or intentional tort claims. The economic loss rule does apply to
negligence claims, and there is no exception for employment cases that would save
Bahnmaier' s negligence claim in this case. Thus, the district court correctly held that
Bahnmaier' s negligence claim must be dismissed.
Fourth, Bahnmaier challenges the district court's dismissal of Bahnmaier' s
defamation claim against Rytting. The parties agreed below that a qualified privilege·
attaches to the statements from Rytting that are at issue in this case. Thus, Bahnmaier
may only overcome this privilege upon a showing that Rytting knowingly made a false

~

statement or otherwise acted with a reckless disregard for the truth. Rather than address
her evidentiary burden, Bahnmaier simply challenges the adequacy of Rytting's
investigation. Because the Utah Supreme Court has held that the qualified privilege may
not be overcome through such a challenge to the adequacy of an investigation, the district
court correctly dismissed the defamation claim against Rytting.
Finally, Bahnmaier challenges the district court's dismissal of Bahnmaier's claim
for intentional interference with economic relations, which is predicated upon her
defamation claim. The parties agreed below that if Bahnmaier' s defamation claim fails,
her interference claim fails with it. Thus, because the district court correctly dismissed
Bahnmaier' s defamation claim, its dismissal of the interference claim is also correct.
20
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON BAHNMAIER'S
EXPRESS AND IMPLIED-IN-FACT CONTRACT CLAIMS SHOULD BE
AFFIRMED.

Bahnmaier alleged that the Hospital breached an express agreement-its for
"cause" termination policy-when it terminated her employment.

The district court

(i)

granted summary judgment on this claim, finding no dispute about the meaning of the
Hospital's for "cause" termination policy and that, based on the undisputed facts, the
Hospital did not breach this policy. See Order, 1131-34. Bahnmaier also alleged that the
Hospital's Substance Use Policy formed an implied-in-fact agreement which she says
was breached when the Hospital did not drug test her prior to terminating her
employment.

The district court dismissed this claim too because (a) the Hospital

disclaimed contractual liability for its Substance Use Policy, and (b) there was no breach
of the Substance Use Policy because drug testing is permissive and not mandatory under
the policy. See Order, 1135-38.
This Court should affirm the district court's summary judgment on the contract
claims because the Hospital fully complied with any possible contract with Bahn.maier.
But such a finding of full-compliance is not even necessary because strict compliance
with the for-cause and Substance Use Policies was not even required.

Instead,

"substantial compliance" with the purposes of these alleged employment procedures is all
that is required. Piacitelli v. Southern Utah State College, 636 P.2d 1063, 1066-67 (Utah
1981), abrogated on other grounds by, USA Power, LLC v. Pacificorp, 2016 UT 20, 1
107, 372 P .3d 629. This is because employment contracts form "a relationship of mutual
21
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trust and confidence, not an adversary relationship or an impersonal commercial contract.
In this context, contract compliance on both sides should be measured by the substance of
the relationship, not by its technical terms." Id. at 1067. Thus, "so long as the substantial
interests [the employment] procedures are designed to safeguard are in fact satisfied and
<i

protected, failure to conform to every technical detail of the [employment] procedure is
not actionable." Id.

Accordingly, as explained more fully below, the district court

properly dismissed Bahnmaier' s contract claims because the Hospital fully complied, and
"at least substantially complied with the purposes of its 'for cause' termination policy and
its Substance Use Policy." See Order, ,r 38 (citing Piacitelli, 636 P.2d at 1066).
A.

The Hospital Did Not Breach Its For Cause Termination Policy.

There is no dispute that the Hospital agreed to terminate Bahnmaier' s employment
only for "cause." However, the Hospital's obligation in this regard is not subject to some
•

undefined 'just cause" standard. Instead, the Hospital carefully and broadly defined
"cause" in Bahnmaier' s Employment Agreement and in a Retention Bonus Agreement.
R0266-67, 0269-71.

Bahnmaier' s Employment Agreement and Retention Bonus

Agreement both provide the following definition:

"Cause is defined as a reason for

disciplinary action that is not arbitrary, capricious, or illegal, that is based on facts that
the employer reasonably believes to be true." R0269-71. Bahnmaier does not contend
that the basis for her employment termination was either capricious or illegal. Instead,
Bahnmaier argues that there is a dispute of fact about whether Corbie Peterson (the
manager who made the employment termination decision) acted upon a reasonable belief

22
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or acted arbitrarily. Particularly in light of Bahnmaier' s own admissions, there is no such
material dispute.

1.

The Hospital's Employment Decision Was Based on a
Reasonable Belief.

On April 10, 2012, Corbie Peterson, the Hospital's Executive Director of Surgical
Services, terminated Bahnmaier's employment because: (a) Peterson believed two
independent reports she had received that Bahnmaier had admitted to being under the
influence of alcohol while at work on March 29, 2012; and (b) Peterson believed that this
was Bahnmaier's second violation of the Hospital's Substance Use Policy. R0297, 0458.
Bahnmaier argues that Peterson's belief in this regard was unreasonable for four
reasons. First, Bahnmaier argues that Peterson's belief that Bahnmaier had violated the
Substance Use Policy was unreasonable because Rytting did not administer a drug test.
Bahnmaier suggests that "this alone" calls the reasonableness of Peterson's decision into
question.

However, Bahnmaier ignores that there is at least one reasonable and

alternative way short of a drug test to determine if an employee has violated the
Substance Use Policy: the involved employee can admit to the violation.
There is no dispute that -Peterson received separate reports from Rytting and
Brimhall that Bahnmaier had admitted to being under the influence of alcohol at work.
R0293-97. Rytting reported to Peterson that, after giving Bahnmaier the option of taking

c:t

a drug test or going home on March 29, 2012, Bahnmaier replied, "I won't pass the test, I
know I won't." R0293. Similarly, Brimhall reported that Bahnmaier told him that by the
time she received a call to come to work on March 29, 2012 "she was drunk." R0295.

23
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Ci)

Bahnmaier did not come forward with any evidence to suggest that Peterson should have
doubted these independent reports, such as any evidence of bias. Indeed, it is undisputed
that Brimhall had never met Bahnmaier and that he had no prior knowledge of the events
of March 29, 2012, at the time he made his report. R0779.
Further, in light of the admissions she made during her deposition, Bahnmaier
cannot credibly dispute the reports from Rytting and Brimhall. Bahnmaier admits that
she "could" have made a statement to Rytting that gave Rytting the impression that she
would have failed a drug test. R0320 (81:10 to 83:12). Bahnmaier also testified that she
would not state that Brimhall lied about what he reported nor could she even remember
the substance of the discussion. R0323 (95:14-23). Thus, because there is no dispute
about the reasonableness of Peterson's reliance on the reports she received from Rytting
and Brimhall, the district court correctly held "that a trier of fact could not reasonably
€i

conclude that Peterson did not reasonably believe that Bahnmaier had violated the
Substance Use Policy." See Order, ,r 34.
Second, Bahnmaier argues that, "in light of the duties to preserve evidence," a
question of fact was created because the Hospital was not able to locate a possible email
from Rytting to Peterson dated March 30, 2012 that may have summarized Rytting's
exchange with Bahnmaier on March 29, 2012. 6 But Bahnmaier did not make a spoliation

As an initial matter, it is not clear that an email from Rytting to Peterson dated
March 30, 2012, ever existed. What is clear is that Rytting sent an email to Peterson
dated April 3, 2012, that summarizes the events of March 29, 2012. R0293. Peterson
testified that she recalled receiving "an email" from Rytting about the events of
March 29, 2012, and that she forwarded this email to Human Resources. R0418 (56:6-

6
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argument-or file a Motion for sanctions under Rule 37 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure-in opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment below.7

This new

argument should not be considered for the first time on appeal. See Menzies v. State,
2014 UT 40, ,I 72 n.69, 344 P.3d 581 (when a party "raises claims for the first time on
appeal," the appellate court will decline to reach them unless the party urging review
"argue[s] that either exceptional circumstances or plain error justify review"). 8
In any event, Bahnmaier acknowledges in her opening brief that that there is no
material dispute about the substance of Rytting's March 30, 2012, report to Peterson: "it
is undisputed that [Rytting] said something indicating that Bahnmaier had been under the
influence of something the day before [on March 29, 2012]."

See Aplt. Br. at 31.

Additionally, in Bahnmaier's own statement of the facts, she concedes that, on March 30,
2012, Rytting told Peterson that Bahnmaier "came to work and was inebriated and unable

23), 0420 (62:11-13). And there is no dispute that Peterson forwarded Rytting's April 3,
2012 email to the Human Resources Department. R0293.
7 Sanctions under Rule 37 for alleged spoliation of evidence are warranted only "'when
(1) the party's behavior was willful; (2) the party has acted in bad faith; (3) the court can
attribute some fault to the party; or (4) the party has engaged in persistent dilatory tactics
tending to frustrate the judicial process."' See Macris v. Sevea Intern., Inc., 2013 UT
App 176, il 29, 307 P.2d 625. Bahnmaier did not attempt to make any such showing to
the district court and does not attempt to do so now on appeal.
8

Even if Bahnmaier pivots in her reply brief to argue an exceptional circumstances or
plain error exception to the preservation requirement, the Court should not consider such
arguments, as Utah appellate courts "have consistently 'refused to consider arguments of
plain error raised for the first time in an appellant's reply brief ...." See Marcoft v.
Labor Comm 'n, 2015 UT App 174, il 4, 356 P.3d 164; see also State v. Robinson, 2014
UT App 114, ilil 9-12, 327 P.3d 589 (concluding that "a plain error argument presented
for the first time in a reply brief is beyond our reach").
25
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to function." Id. at 16 (149). Bahnmaier further concedes that "Peterson understood
Rytting to be telling her that Bahnmaier was drunk on alcohol." Id. (151).
Importantly, there also is no dispute that Rytting sent an email to Peterson dated
April 3, 2012, that contains a detailed description of the events of March 29, 2012.
~

R0293.

The information contained in Rytting's April 3, 2012, email to Peterson is

incorporated in Peterson's April I 0, 2012, termination notice to Bahnmaier.

R0297.

Thus, because there is no material dispute about what Rytting reported to Peterson on
March 30, 2012, and the same information appears anyway in the email dated April 3,
2012, the absence of an email from Rytting to Peterson on March 30, 2012, is not
prejudicial and sanctions under Rule 37 would not have been warranted. See Rosen v.

Saratoga Springs City, 2012 UT App 291, 127, 288 P.3d 606 (holding that sanctions
under Rule 37 were not warranted, even though the defendant lost a recording of a
(ib

conversation, because other testimony was available to confirm what was said at the
meeting and there was otherwise no dispute about what was discussed).
Third, Bahnmaier argues that Peterson could not have reasonably believed that
Bahnmaier violated the Substance Use Policy because Peterson purportedly "did no
investigation regarding Bahnmaier' s condition." As an initial matter, the for "cause"
termination policy does not require the Hospital to conduct an investigation-it requires
only reliance "on facts that the employer reasonably believes to be true." In any event,
Peterson actually did conduct an investigation. Peterson spoke to, and received a written
report from, Rytting and she also received a written report from Brimhall. Both of these
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reports contained the same thing: Bahnmaier' s admission to a violation of the Substance
Use Policy on the day in question. R0293-95.
Furthermore, Peterson's receipt of the reports from Rytting and Brimhall must be
placed in context. Peterson had previously disciplined Bahnmaier on May 26, 2011, for
Bahnmaier's first violation of the Substance Use Policy.

R0249, 0291, 0775.

In

connection with this first warning, Bahnmaier had admitted to being under the influence
of alcohol while she was on call and was not drug tested. R0313-14 (55:23 to 56:14,
60:3-5), 0412 (30:16-20), 0775-76. Bahnmaier did not dispute this warning. R0314
(58:20-22), 0417 (51: 13-17). Thus, when Peterson received additional reports ten months
later concerning Bahnmaier's admission to a second violation of the Substance Use
Policy, Peterson was disappointed and saddened that Bahnmaier had failed to improve
and believed that Bahnmaier had once again exhibited poor judgment that endangered
Hospital patients. R0297, 0458.
Accordingly, based on the undisputed facts, the district court correctly held that
the Hospital did not breach the terms of its express and broad for "cause" termination
policy. See Order,

11 31-34.

There is simply no evidence in the record to dispute the

reasonableness of Peterson's belief that Bahnmaier had admitted to a violation of the
Substance Use Policy.
~

As noted above, strict compliance with the for "cause" termination policy is not
even required.

Instead, summary judgment was appropriate upon a finding that the

Hospital at least substantially complied with the purposes of its for "cause" termination
policy. See Piacitelli, 636 P .2d at 1066-67. The purpose of the for "cause" termination
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policy is not in dispute. As Bahnmaier points out, Hospital employees were taught that
the purpose of the for "cause" termination policy is to require some "valid reason" to
terminate an employment relationship. See Aplt. Br., p. 8 (,I 7). Peterson had a "valid
reason" to end Bahnmaier' s employment: a second perceived violation of the Substance
i>

Use Policy. The Hospital simply is not in a position to take chances with the lives of its
heart surgery patients when it has received two independent reports that one of its
surgical technicians has admitted to being at work while under the influence of alcohol.
Accordingly, the district court was correct when it held, in the alternative, that
Bahnmaier' s breach of contract claims fails because the Hospital "at least substantially
complied with purposes of its "for cause" termination policy ...." See Order, ,I 38.
2.

The Hospital's Employment Decision Was Not Arbitrary. ·

Next, Bahnmaier argues that there was a material dispute of fact about whether the
~

Hospital's termination decision was arbitrary. Whether Peterson acted in an arbitrary
way must be viewed in the context of the work being done-assisting with heart surgery.
That a Hospital might favor patient-safety in such circumstances is not arbitrary.
Nevertheless, Bahnmaier argues that she adduced evidence of two other Hospital
employees who were suspected of violating the Substance Use Policy and were not
terminated.

Before the district court, Bahnmaier supported this argument with

~

unauthenticated personnel records that describe discipline issued to two other employees,
without any accompanying affidavits or other sworn testimony to authenticate these
records or otherwise place them in context. Rl 171-1177. Thus, the district court had
discretion to disregard all such evidence. See Johnson v. Hermes Associates, Ltd., 2005
28
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•
UT 82,

,r 21,

128 P.3d 1151 ("a party puts the legitimacy of a fact, supported by

affidavits, depositions, or other sworn testimony, in dispute by presenting equally

•

meaningful, sworn testimony in the form of affidavits, depositions, or inten-ogatories.").
In any event, the personnel records relied on by Bahmnaier do not create an issue
of fact that the Hospital acted in an arbitrary manner or otherwise treated Bahnmaier
differently than similarly-situated employees.

•

The first personnel record is a

Performance Improvement Counseling Form issued under materially

different

circumstances to an employee who, for purposes of this appeal, is refen-ed to as "RD."

•

Rl 172-73. Based solely on the Performance Improvement Counseling Form, it appears
that employee RD's perfonnance level changed and that employee RD was instructed to
"submit to a drug screen and be suspended pending results."

Rll 72.

There is no

evidence in the record concerning the outcome of this drug screen or whether employee
RD's employment was ultimately terminated. But most impo11antly, there is no evidence

•

in the record that employee RD ' s manager received reports that employee RD had
admitted that she would fail a drug test or admitted that she was under the influence of
drugs or alcohol while at work, or that this was a second offense.

•

The second set of personnel records relied on by Bahnmaier shows that Bahnmaier
was treated the same as other employees. This set of records includes a Perfonnance
Improvement Counseling Form and a subsequent employment termination notice issued

•

to an employee who, for purposes of this appeal, is referred to as "RZ." Rll 74-77.
There is no clear evidence in the Performance Improvement Counseling Form that the
Hospital administered a drug test to employee RZ.

Instead, employee RZ simply
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•

•

admitted that "the drug test will be positive" and was disciplined for her violation of the

•

Substance Use Policy. Rll 74. Employee RZ received a written warning and was not
terminated upon her first violation of the Substance Use Policy. Id.
Bahnmaier also received a written warning for her first violation of the Substance

•

Use Policy. R0249, 0291, 0775. Like employee RZ, Bahnmaier also admitted to her first
violation of the Substance Use Policy. On May 7, 2011, Bahnmaier consumed alcohol
while she was on call, admitted to a coworker (Claudia Swanson) that she had consumed
"one beer," and the coworker agreed to switch the on call assignment to another
employee.

R0291, 0313-14 (55:24 to 60:5).

Bahnmaier was not fired for her first

violation of the Substance Use Policy and instead received a written warning (which she
did not dispute) that further policy violations "will result in additional disciplinary action
up to and including termination." R0291, 1174-75.
Ultimately, it appears that employee RZ's employment was terminated for reasons
unrelated to the use of drugs or alcohol while on duty (according to the termination
notice, employee RZ apparently lost her employment because she did not properly chart
or dispose of medication). Rl 176. In any event, there is no evidence that a drug test was
administered in connection with the termination of employee RZ's employment. Id.
Accordingly, if the unauthenticated personnel records of employees RD and RZ even are
considered by this Court (which they should not be), these records do not create a
material or genuine issue of fact that precludes entry of summary judgment.

30
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The Substance Use Policy Is Not a Contract and, In Any Event,
Was Not Violated.

B.

Bahnmaier alleges that the Hospital's Substance Use Policy forms an implied-infact contract that was breached when the Hospital did not administer a drug test prior to
terminating her employment. R00 15-16. The district court properly granted summary
judgment on this claim for two reasons: (1) the Hospital disclaimed contractual liability
for its Substance Use Policy in its employment application and in two subsequent
employment agreements signed by Bahnmaier; and (2) the policy was not breached
because "[t]esting under the policy was permissive and not mandatory." See Order,

11 36-3 7.

Both of these alternative holdings are correct and should be affirmed.

1.

The Hospital Disclaiined Contractual Liability for Its
Substance Use Policy.

It is undisputed that when Bahnmaier applied to work at the Hospital, she signed
to acknowledge the following contract disclaimer that appears in all capital letters on her
application:
I UNDERSTAND AND AGREE THAT ANY EMPLOYEE HANDBOOK
WHICH I MAY RECEIVE WILL NOT CONSTITUTE AN
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT, BUT WILL BE MERELY A
GRATUITOUS STATEMENT OF FACILITY POLICIES.
R0245. With the exception of a for "cause" termination policy that was later adopted, the
Hospital confirmed in writing in two separate employment contracts signed by
Bahnmaier that it was not obligated to employ her under any other terms or conditions.
On March 1, 2007, in conjunction with a retention bonus paid to her by the Hospital,
Bahnmaier signed a Retention Bonus Agreement which states: "Nothing in this
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~

Agreement will be construed to obligate HOSPITAL to employ EMPLOYEE for any
particular time or under any particular terms or conditions of employment." R0266-67.
In June of 2008, when Bahnmaier accepted a position on the Hospital's Cardiovascular
Heart Surgery Team, she signed an Employment Agreement that also disclaims:
"Nothing in this Agreement will be construed to obligate HOSPITAL to employ
EMPLOYEE for any particular time or under any particular terms or conditions of
employment." R0269-71.
These clear and conspicuous contract disclaimers preclude the Substance Use
Policy from forming an implied-in-fact contract. See Tomlinson v. NCR Corporation,
2014 UT 55,, 25, 345 P.3d 523 (a "clear and conspicuous disclaimer, as a matter of law,
prevents employee manuals or other like material from being considered as implied-infact contract terms."). Moreover, all Hospital employment policies must be construed in
(i

light of these contract disclaimers. See, e.g., Sell v. Hertz Corp., 2:09-cv-147, 2010 WL
4180661 (D. Utah Oct. 20, 2010) ("Utah law provides that 'when an employee handbook
contains a clear and conspicuous disclaimer of contractual liability, any other agreement
must be construed in light of the disclaimer."') (quoting Hodgson v. Bunzl Utah, Inc., 844
P .2d 331, 334 (Utah 1992). Thus, when an employer disclaims contractual liability in
one document (e.g., an employment application, handbook, or contract), all further policy
statements must be read in light of such a statement disclaiming that policies are not
contracts.
For example, in Sell, supra, the court held that an appendix to a bonus plan did not
create an implied-in-fact contract requiring the payment of bonuses, even though the
32
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appendix provided a formula for the calculation of bonuses and did not state that bonuses
were discretionary. In rejecting an implied contract claim based on this appendix, the

~

court relied, in part, upon a disclaimer contained in a separate document (an
acknowledgment form) to find that "no reasonable jury could conclude that [the
appendix] created an implied in fact contract." Id. at *4.
Similarly, in Ingels v. Thiokol Corp., 42 F.3d 616 (10th Cir. 1994), abrogated on
other grounds by, Semsroth v. City of Wichita, 2008 WL 5328466 (10th Cir. Dec. 22,

2008), the district court dismissed a plaintiffs claim that her employer's affirmative
action plan and reduction in force policy constituted implied in fact contracts. Applying
Utah law, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal because the employer
had published in another document-a handbook that disclaimed any intent that any of its
"personnel materials" would "give rise to contractual obligations." 42 F .3d at 624.
Additionally, in Johnson v. City of Murray, 909 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1297 (D. Utah 2012)
ajf'd, 544 F. App'x 801 (10th Cir. 2013), the district court dismissed a plaintiffs claim

that her employer's personnel policies formed an implied contract because of a disclaimer
in a separate document-an employment application.

The employment application

disclaimed: "I understand that this employment application and any other City documents
are not contracts of employment." Id.
(ii

Bahnmaier argues that the disclaimer found in her employment application was
somehow superseded by the Hospital's subsequent agreement to terminate her
employment only for "cause." However, the application broadly disclaims contractual
liability for personnel policies contained in "ANY EMPLOYEE HANDBOOK." R0245.
33
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Although the Hospital later modified the at-will nature of Bahnmaier' s employment
relationship to include a for "cause" termination policy, the Hospital never agreed to
convert any of its other personnel policies to contracts or to supersede or withdraw the
policy disclaimer in its employment application. Thus, except regarding the for "cause"
termination policy, none of the Hospital's other personnel policies have ever formed a
contract.
Even if the application somehow was not sufficient standing alone to disclaim
contractual liability for the Hospital's personnel policies, the Hospital's two subsequent
employment agreements with Bahnmaier are sufficient. Bahnmaier signed a Retention
Bonus Agreement on March 1, 2007, and an Employment Agreement on June 26, 2008.
R0266-71. These agreements define the contractual relationship between the Hospital
and Bahnmaier (including the for "cause" termination policy). Except for a for "cause"
(i)

termination policy, neither agreement requires drug testing or compliance with any other
personnel policy. Id.

To the contrary, both contracts disclaim that "Nothing in this

Agreement will be construed to obligate HOSPITAL to employ EMPLOYEE for any
particular time or under any particular terms or conditions of employment."

Id.

(emphasis added).
Bahnmaier argues for the first time on appeal that neither of these disclaimers is
sufficient to avoid contractual liability for the separate Substance Use Policy because the
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disclaimers are limited to "this Agreement. " 9 However, the phrase "this Agreement"
refers to the Hospital's entire agreement to employ Bahnmaier.

Because Bahnmaier

expressly agreed that, apart from the for-cause termination policy, the Hospital had no
obligation to employ her under any other terms or conditions, her implied-in-fact contract
claim fails. Accordingly, the district court was correct when it found from the undisputed
facts "that the Hospital clearly and conspicuously disclaimed contractual liability for its
Substance Use Policy in its employment application" and in the Retention Bonus
Agreement and Employment Agreement. See Order, ,r 35.

2.

The Hospital Did Not Violate the Substance Use Policy.

Even if the Substance Use Policy did somehow form an implied-in-fact
employment contract-which it does not-this policy does not require drug testing. It is
undisputed that Bahnmaier signed to acknowledge that she had received, read, and
understood the Hospital's Substance Use Policy on June 16, 2005. R0273 (referred to as

<il

the Drug and Alcohol Policy), 0774. This acknowledgment card expressly states that
drug testing "may be required." R0273. The word "may" is permissive, not mandatory,
and does not state that a drug test "shall" always be used or must be administered. The
policy itself also contains no requirement that drug tests be administered in all cases of a
suspected violation. R0275-82. Instead, the policy simply provides the testing protocols
that will be used if a test is administered. R0278-79. Importantly, although the policy
requires an "investigation" upon "reasonable suspicion" of a policy violation, there is no
Bahnmaier did not make this argument to the district court below. As a result, this
argument based on the phrase "this Agreement" in the Employment Agreement has not
been preserved and should not be considered for the first time on appeal.

9
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•

specific type of investigation required and no requirement that such investigation include
a drug test. R0280. Instead, the scope of such an investigation is left to the discretion of
the Hospital. Id. The Substance Use Policy also includes a section about "voluntary selfreporting." Id. In such cases, when an employee admits to a violation of the policy, the
(i

policy does not require (or even mention) drug testing. Id.
Finally, the Hospital's Code of Conduct (which Bahnmaier received on July 11,
2005) also includes supplemental instructions about substance abuse in the workplace.
R0256, 0288.

The Code of Conduct also expressly provides that drug testing is

permissive and not mandatory: "We may use drug testing as a means of enforcing this
policy." R0288 (emphasis added). Accordingly, even if the Substance Use Policy was a
contract, the Hospital did not violate this policy when it elected not to administer a drug
test to Bahnmaier because the policy left that decision to the discretion of the Hospital.
(i

As a result, the district court's decision to grant summary judgment on Bahnmaier's
implied-in-fact contract claim also should be affirmed.
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON BAHNMAIER'S
CLAIM FOR BREACH OF THE IMPLIED-IN-LAW COVENANT OF
GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING SHOULD BE AFFIRMED.
A.

Bahnmaier Has Waived Any Argument that the District Court
Erred When It Dismissed Her Claim for Breach of the Implied
Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing.

Bahnmaier treats the district court's dismissal of her claim for breach of the
implied-in-law covenant of good faith in a mere footnote in her brief, without addressing
(or indicating that she is assigning error on appeal to) the district court's two alternative
reasons for dismissing this claim. Bahnmaier mistakenly states that the "only argument"
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that the Hospital has made in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment on her claim
for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing was that Bahnmaier
remained an "at-will" employee. See Aplt. Br., p. 23 n.4. The Hospital did not pursue
this argument in its reply memorandum or at oral argument. Thus, Bahnmaier assumes
that "both parties agree [this] is not correct." Id. However, Bahnmaier does not make
any argument addressing why this claim should have survived summary judgment or
otherwise assign any error to the district courts' dismissal of it.
Bahnmaier' s assertions are incorrect-the Hospital made an additional argument
that Bahnmaier' s claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith should be
dismissed. Specifically, the Hospital argued that Bahnmaier's claim for breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing should be dismissed because it is identical
to her breach of contract claims. R0229, 0934-35, 1100. The Hospital maintained that
the "implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 'has nothing to do with the
enforcement' of alleged contract terms." R0934-35 (citing Zisumbo v. Ogden Regional
Medical Center, No. 1:10-cv-74, 2013 WL 1194717, * 10-11 (D. Utah March 22, 2013)).

This means that such a claim is irrelevant and not merited when it seeks to enforce the
same rights outlined in alleged contract provisions.
The district court agreed and held that "because Bahnmaier has only alleged a
breach of express or implied contract terms, her claim for breach of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing fails and must be dismissed." See Order, 1 29. The district
court also dismissed Bahnmaier's breach-of-the-implied-covenant claim for the following
second, alternative reason:
37
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[T]he Court finds that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
cannot be contrary to the express tenns of the parties' agreement. For the
reasons stated . . . below, the Court finds that a trier of fact could not
reasonably conclude that the Hospital breached any of the alleged contract
terms. Accordingly, there can be no violation of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing and summary judgment is granted for this
additional reason.
See Order,

1 30

(internal citation omitted) (citing Smith v. Grand Canyon Expeditions

Co., 2003 UT 57, 122, 84 P .3d 1154, 1160 ("The reach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing extends no further than the purposes and express terms of the
contract.")); see also R1143. Bahnmaier fails to assign error to (or even acknowledge)
either of the alternative basis for district court's dismissal of her implied covenant of
good faith claim.
"When challenging a trial court's decision, ... an appellant must address all of the
circumstances upon which the court's decision was based." See State v. Montiel, 2004
(I

UT App 242,

1 20, 95 P .3d 1216; see also Allen v.

Friel, 2008 UT 56, 1 7, 194 P .3d 903

("If an appellant fails to allege specific errors of the lower court, the appellate court will

not seek out errors in the lower court's decision."). A failure to address an independent
ground for a district court's ruling constitutes a waiver of any objection to that ground.
See Salt Lake Cty. v. Butler, Crockett & Walsh Dev. Corp., 2013 UT App 30, ,I 28, 297
P.3d 38.

Thus, because Bahnmaier has not assigned error to the district court's

alternative reasons for dismissing her claim for breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing, she has waived this issue and the district court's dismissal of this
claim should be affinned.
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B.

The Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Claim
Was Correctly Dismissed.

If this Court addresses the merits of the district court's dismissal of Bahnmaier's
claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing-which it should
not do-it should affirm dismissal because the district court's decision is correct.
Bahnmaier seems to confuse the distinction between a claim for breach of an implied-infact contract and breach of the implied-in-law covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
These are wholly distinct claims. In her Complaint, Bahnmaier alleges that the Hospital

<i

breached the terms of an express and implied-in-fact contract (her fifth cause of action)
when it terminated her employment without administering a drug test.

ROO 15.

Bahnmaier also alleged that the Hospital breached an implied-in-law covenant of good

~

faith and fair dealing (her fourth cause of action) in the same way, when it terminated her
employment without administering a drug test. R0014. Thus, Bahnmaier's contract and
implied-covenant claims are identical, and seek to enforce the same alleged rights.
Utah courts recognize an important distinction between a breach of contract claim
(either express or implied-in-fact) and a claim for breach of the implied-in-law covenant
of good faith and fair dealing. "[A]s distinguished from a contract's express terms, the
[implied-in-law] covenant [of good faith and fair dealing] 'is based on judicially
recognized duties not found within the four corners of the contract."' Markham v.
Bradley, 2007 UT App 379,
Ins. Exch., 2005 UT 21,

il 18, 173 P.3d 865, 871 (quoting

Christiansen v. Farmers

il 10, 116 P.3d 193). Thus, when an employee seeks to enforce

the express terms of a contract (including a contract implied-in-fact), the only appropriate
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~

vehicle is a claim for breach of contract-not for breach of the implied-in-law covenant
of good faith and fair dealing.

See Zisumbo, 2013 WL 1194717, * 10-11 (D. Utah

March 22, 2013) (dismissing claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing against employer hospital where plaintiff "seeks to enforce what he asserts to

<9

be the express terms of the [HCA] Code of Conduct."); see also Advanced Recovery Sys.
LLC v. Am. Agencies LLC, No. 2:13-cv-283, 2013 WL 5969837, *1 ("where allegations
made in support of the breach of good faith claim are based on the express terms of the
contract, 'courts must rely solely on the contract itself and cannot entertain claims based
on an implied duty to perform in good faith."'). Accordingly, because Bahnmaier's claim
for breach of the implied-in-law covenant of good faith and fair dealing is premised on
her identical alleged violations of contracts (both express and implied-in-fact), the district
court's dismissal of this claim was correct and should be affirmed.
Furthermore, for the reasons articulated above, the Hospital has not violated any
express or implied-in-fact contract, i.e., it reasonably believed that cause existed to
terminate Bahnmaier' s employment and no drug test was required. In the absence of
such a breach, Bahnmaier' s implied-in-law covenant of good faith claim fails because
this covenant "cannot be contrary to the express terms of the parties' agreement." See
Order,

~

30 (citing Smith, 2003 UT 57, at

~

22). In other words, Bahnmaier cannot use

the implied covenant of good faith to create an obligation not imposed by the alleged
contracts themselves.

Thus, the district court's alternative basis for dismissal of the

implied covenant of good faith claim should also be affirmed.
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tt
THE DISTRICT COURT'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON BAHNMAIER'S
NEGLIGENCE CLAIM SHOULD BE AFFIRMED.

III.

The economic loss rule bars a negligence claim when: ( 1) the defendant does not
owe the plaintiff a duty that is independent of any contractual obligation, and (2) the
defendant has not caused any property damage or bodily injury. See Davencourt at
~

Pilgrims Landing Homeowners Ass 'n v. Davencourt at Pilgrims Landing, LC, 2009 UT
65, ilil 18-19, 221 P.3d 234,242. The Utah Supreme Court has described the broad scope
of the economic loss rule this way:
"The economic loss rule is a judicially created doctrine that marks the
fundamental boundary between contract law, which protects expectancy
interests created through agreement between the parties, and tort law, which
protects individuals and their property from physical harm by imposing a
duty of reasonable care." "[A]bsent physical property damage [i.e., damage
to other property,] or bodily injury," this doctrine prohibits recovery of
economic losses.
Id. at

iJ 18 (internal citation omitted) (quoting SME Indus., Inc. v. Thompson, Ventulett,

Stainback & Assocs., Inc., 2001 UT 54,

iJ 32, 28 P.3d 669 and American Towers Owners

Ass'n, Inc. v. CCI Mechanical, Inc., 930 P.2d 1182, 1189 (Utah 1996)).
There is no dispute that the Defendants' sole alleged duties to Bahnmaier here are
those arising from her alleged express and implied-in-fact contracts.

A review of

Bahnmaier' s Complaint demonstrates that her negligence cause of action is based on the
exact same alleged duties she relies upon in support of her contract claims: a duty to
terminate employment only for cause and a duty to drug test. R00 11-12, 0015-16

•

(ilil 18-

26, 48-52). Bahnmaier acknowledges the overlap between her negligence and contract
claims in her opening brief to this Court, where she alleges that the Hospital breached "a
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@

(j)

duty to immediately drug test" and a duty "to terminate her for a valid reason only." See
Aplt. Br., p. 27. However, Bahnmaier does not identify any other duty arising under
Utah law, independent of her alleged express and implied-in-fact contracts with the
Hospital, to drug test or to terminate for cause. Thus, Bahnmaier' s negligence claim is

'1

barred by the economic loss rule unless she demonstrates property damage or bodily
injury. Bahnmaier has not alleged either form of injury.
Instead, Bahnmaier argues that the economic loss rule should not apply where
emotional distress damages are alleged. However, unlike "physical or property damage,"
allegations of emotional distress "do not remove claims from the scope of the economic
loss rule." See, e.g., Fry/ogle v. First Nat'! Bank of Greencastle, No. 6:07-cv-00035,
2009 WL 700161, *7 (W.D. Va. March 17, 2009) (citing and collecting cases); see also
Brockbank v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, NA., No. 2:l 1-cv-671, 2012 WL 142933, *5 (D.

•

Utah April 4, 2012) (holding that the economic loss rule barred claim for negligent
infliction of emotional distress). Indeed, there is no need for such an exception to the
economic loss rule because emotional distress damages may be recovered under a breach
of contract theory in Utah. See Cabaness v. Thomas, 2010 UT 23, ~ 71, 232 P.3d 486.
Yet, Bahnmaier argues that the Utah Supreme Court in the Cabaness decision
crafted an exception to the economic loss rule "in the context of an employment case, in
which a plaintiff alleges emotional distress damages in addition to lost wages." See Aplt.
Br., p. 27. The Utah Supreme Court has done no such thing. In fact, the Cabaness
decision does not even mention the economic loss rule. The Supreme Court pennitted
claims for implied contract and intentional infliction of emotional distress to go to a jury.
42
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Cabaness, 2010 UT 23, 1 82. However, under Utah law, the economic loss rule does not

apply to contracts or intentional torts-it serves only as a bar to non-intentional tort (e.g.,
negligence) claims. See American Towers Owners v. CCI Mechanical, 930 P.2d 1182,
1189 (Utah 1996) (economic loss rule applies to "non-intentional tort" claims). There is
simply no employee/employer exception to the economic loss rule. Thus, the economic

'1

loss rule bars Bahnmaier' s negligence claim and the dismissal of this claim should be
affirmed.
IV.

THE DISTRICT COURT'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON BAHNMAIER'S
DEFAMATION CLAIM AGAINST RYTTING SHOULD BE AFFIRMED.

Bahnmaier alleges that Rytting, her direct supervisor, defamed her when Rytting
reported to Peterson, the department director, that Bahnmaier appeared to be under the

~

influence of alcohol at work and had admitted that she would fail a drug test. There is no
dispute that a qualified privilege attaches to these statements.

Rl 102.

A qualified

privilege attaches to statements "made to protect the legitimate interest of the publisher."
See Brehany v. Nordstrom, 812 P.2d 49, 58 (Utah 1991). For example, "[t]his qualified

privilege protects an employer's communication to employees and to other interested
parties concerning the reasons for an employee's discharge." Id.
When a qualified privilege applies, a plaintiff bears the evidentiary burden to
demonstrate that the publisher of the alleged defamatory statement abused the privilege.

8

Id. The district court correctly observed that "[t]he parties agree that a qualified privilege

extends to the statements by Rytting that are at issue in this case, including Rytting's
statement that Bahnmaier admitted that she would have failed a drug test, which
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9

statements were reported only to Rytting's supervisor (Peterson) and an HR Manager
(Wood)."

See Order,

il 23;

see also Rl 102 (through legal counsel, Bahnmaier

acknowledged at the hearing on the Motion for Summary Judgment that the qualified
privilege applies and shifts the evidentiary burden to her).
Thus, to show that Rytting abused the qualified privilege, Bahnmaier must
establish that Rytting either: ( 1) actually knew her statement was false or (2) acted with a
reckless disregard as to its falsity. See Ferguson v. Williams & Hunt, Inc., 2009 UT 49,

il 28, 221

P.3d 205, 214-215. Because Bahnmaier did not come forward with such facts

below, the district court's order granting summary judgment on the defamation claim
against Rytting should be affirmed.

1.

There Are No Facts in the Record to Show that Rytting
Knew Her Statement About Bahnmaier Was False.

To prove knowledge of falsity, Bahnmaier must make a showing of Rytting's
"subjective intent," i.e., she must show that Rytting actually believed her statement was
untrue. Ferguson, 2009 UT 49, at

il 30.

No reasonable jury could believe that Rytting

actually believed her statements were untrue when Bahnmaier herself admits that she
"could" have made a "smart aleck" remark that gave Rytting the impression that she
would fail a drug test. R0320 (81:10 to 83:12); see also Order, il 25.
On appeal, Bahnmaier seems to acknowledge that she is not able to challenge
Rytting's subjective intent. In fact, Bahnmaier admits that she "obviously cannot know
how Rytting interpreted what she said."

See Aplt. Br., p. 31.

Thus, the focus of
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Bahnmaier' s appeal seems to be that there is an issue of fact about whether Rytting acted
with a reckless disregard for the truth. Id. at pp. 30-33.
Even so, buried in argument concerning the reckless indifference prong of
qualified privilege, Bahnmaier does make one argument about Rytting's subjective intent.
Bahnmaier argues that there is a question of fact about whether Rytting knowingly made
a false statement to Peterson because Rytting allowed Bahnmaier to drive home on
March 29, 2012. See Aplt. Br., p. 32. However, there is no evidence in the record to
show that Bahnmaier drove herself to work on March 29, 2012, let alone evidence that
Rytting knew that Bahnmaier would drive herself home on March 29, 2012.10
Accordingly, there is no genuine issue of fact that Rytting knowingly made a false
statement about Bahnmaier.
2.

There Are No Facts in the Record to Show that Rytting
Acted With Reckless Disregard for the Truth.

To prove that Rytting acted with a reckless disregard for the truth, Bahnmaier
must demonstrate that Rytting's statement was "inherently improbable" or was the
subject of "obvious doubt" when it was made.

See Ferguson, 2009 UT 49,

,r 30.

Bahnmaier may not make this showing, however, by simply attacking the adequacy of
Rytting' s investigation. The Utah Supreme Court has expressly stated that, "[w]bile there

It also bears noting that the legal blood alcohol limit for driving in Utah is twice the
blood alcohol level stated in the Substance Use Policy. R0277-78 ("employee is
presumed to be under the influence of alcohol if [the employee has] a blood alcohol level
of .04 or more"); Utah Code § 41-61-502 (a person may not operate a vehicle if that
person has a blood alcohol concentration of .08 or more). Thus, whether one is too
intoxicated to drive presents a different question from whether one is too intoxicated to
assist with heart surgery.
10
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may be questions about the adequacy of Defendants' investigation and what, in hindsight,
may appear to have been premature and possibly erroneous conclusions, [such] evidence
does not satisfy the standard of abuse required for the conditional privilege." Id. at ,I 33.
Moreover, the "conditional privilege also permits mistakes to be made .... " Id. at ,I 27.
Yet, the entire thrust of Bahnmaier' s argument here is that Rytting was mistaken and that
Rytting' s investigation was inadequate. She asserts this point in four ways.
First, Bahnmaier attempts to contradict her own sworn deposition testimony by
suggesting that she never actually made a statement that could have given Rytting the
impression that she would have failed a drug test. There can be no dispute about what
Bahnmaier said under oath at her deposition (the entire exchange appears in the record at
R0320). In sum, although Bahnmaier said that she did not intend to make an admission
when she spoke with Rytting about failing a drug test, she acknowledged that that she
still "could" have made a "smart aleck" remark that left Rytting with the impression that
she would fail a drug test.

R0320 (81: 10 to 82: 10).

Then the following exchange

occurred between counsel and Bahnmaier:
Q
Okay. So if I understand you correctly, you could have made a
comment to [Rytting] that would have given her the impression that you
said, "I won't pass the test." You could have said something like that?

•

A:

I could - I could - I don't recall the conversation .

Id. (82:11-16) (emphasis added).

Any subsequent statement from Bahnmaier that she could not have given Rytting
an impression that she would fail a drug test cannot create a genuine issue of fact. The
"utility of summary judgment as a procedure for screening out sham fact issues would be
46
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greatly undermined if a party could create an issue of fact merely by ... contradicting his
own prior testimony." Franks v. Nimmo, 196 F.2d 1230, 1237 (10th Cir. 1986); see also
Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1173 (Utah 1983) (affirming grant of summary judgment

where plaintiff contradicted his prior deposition testimony and failed to provide an
explanation for the discrepancy). Accordingly, it cannot be disputed that Bahnmaier
admits she "could" have made a remark that gave Rytting the impression that Bahnmaier
would have failed a drug test.
Second, Bahnmaier argues-again, for the first time on appeal-that the
"suspicious disappearance" of Rytting's possible March 30, 2012, email to Peterson may
create an issue of fact. See Aplt. Br., p. 31. However, in the same sentence Bahnmaier
acknowledges that "it is undisputed that [Rytting] said something [to Peterson] indicating
that Bahnmaier had been under the influence of something the day before."

Id.

Furthermore, as described above, it is undisputed that Rytting sent an email to Peterson
dated April 3, 2012, that contains a detailed description of the events of March 29, 2012.
R0293.

The- information contained in Rytting's April 3, 2012, email to Peterson is

incorporated in Peterson's April 10, 2012, termination notice to Bahnmaier.

R0297.

Thus, there is no material dispute about what Rytting told to Peterson.
Third, Bahnmaier argues that another coworker did not smell alcohol on her on
March 29, 2012, that Rytting also did not smell alcohol on Bahnmaier, and "no other
employees provided evidence that Bahnmaier smelled of alcohol that evening." See Aplt.
Br., pp. 31-32. However, it is undisputed that when Rytting met with Bahnmaier on
March 29, 2012, Bahnmaier wore her surgical mask the entire time, covering her mouth
47
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and nose, and was also chewing tobacco. R0318 (74:5-25), 0394 (130:17-18, 131:10-16).
Moreover, the subjective belief of one coworker who did not believe that Bahnmaier was
intoxicated has no bearing on whether Rytting acted with reckless disregard for the truth.
Importantly, there is no evidence that this other coworker shared this belief with Rytting.
•

On the other hand, Bahnmaier does not dispute that yet another coworker believed that
Bahnmaier was under the influence of alcohol and that he reported these concerns to
Rytting. R0451-52, 0777.
Fourth, and ultimately, Bahnmaier argues that Rytting acted with reckless
disregard for the truth because she did not administer a drug test. Bahnmaier argues that
a drug test was the only possible way for Rytting to confirm her suspicions that
Bahnmaier was under the influence of alcohol. Bahnmaier ignores a more conventional
and direct investigative method-Rytting could simply ask Bahnmaier if she was
intoxicated. And there is no dispute that this is exactly what happened. On March 29,
2012, Rytting asked Bahnmaier if she was sober and gave Bahnmaier the option of taking
a drug test or going home. R0293, 0394 (129:3-9, 132:6-23). And again, Bahnmaier
admits that she responded in a way that "could" have given Rytting the impression that
Bahnmaier would fail a drug test. R0320 (82: 11-16). Bahnmaier also admits that Rytting
replied, "I didn't think so. Now go home." Id. (82:22 to 83:3). 11

11

Bahnmaier also makes one additional argument which has nothing at all to do with
Rytting's conduct at the time she made her report about Bahnmaier. Bahnmaier argues
that Rytting never bothered to find out the test results of the drug test administered on
March 30, 2012. See Aplt. Br., p. 32. But the issue here is whether Rytting acted with
reckless disregard at the time she made her statement to Peterson-not at some later date.
Furthermore, Bahnmaier has never articulated the relevance of a test for the presence of
48
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Each one of these four concerns constitutes nothing more than a challenge to the
adequacy of Rytting' s investigation. As a matter of law, such arguments are insufficient
to overcome the qualified privilege. See Ferguson, 2009 UT 49, ,I 33. Again, to show
that Rytting acted with a reckless disregard for the truth, Bahnmaier was required to show
that Rytting's statement was "inherently improbable" or was the subject of "obvious

•

doubt" when it was made. Id. at ,r 30. Bahnmaier failed to meet this evidentiary burden
in the district court below, and fails to point to evidence of improbability or obvious
doubt now. Indeed, how could Bahnmaier possibly show that Rytting's statements were
"inherently improbable" or the subject of "obvious doubt" when Bahnmaier herself
admits that she actually could have given Rytting the impression that she would fail a
drug test?
Based in part on Bahnmaier' s admission that she could have given Rytting the
impression that she would fail a drug test, the district court granted summary judgment

<i)

on the defamation claim and correctly held that "no trier of fact could reasonably
conclude that Rytting knowingly or recklessly made a false statement about her." See
Order,

,r 25; RI 142.

Because Bahnmaier did not meet her burden to come forward with

evidence demonstrating that Rytting's statements were inherently improbable or the

alcohol taken a day after alcohol was consumed. Indeed, Peterson (a nurse), who made
the decision to terminate Bahnmaier' s employment, testified that she expected the drug
test administered on March 30, 2012, to be negative for the presence of alcohol because
of the passage of time between the consumption of alcohol on the day in question and the
administration of the test the following day. R0420 (64:6-9).
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•

subject of obvious doubt, Rytting's statements are privileged and the district court's
decision on the defamation claim should be affirmed.
V.

THE DISTRICT COURT'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON BAHNMAIER'S
INTERFERENCE CLAIM SHOULD BE AFFIRMED.

The parties agree that Bahnmaier's interference claim rises and falls on the
adequacy of her defamation claim. See Aplt. Br., p. 33. Accordingly, because the district
court correctly dismissed Bahnmaier's defamation claim, the district court's dismissal of
her interference claim should be affirmed as well.
CONCLUSION

The Hospital did not breach its for-cause employment termination policy, which
Et)

requires only that the Hospital have some reasonable belief in a basis for termination that
is not arbitrary, capricious, or illegal. Peterson, the decision-maker here, received two
independent reports-from a supervisor and a Human Resources manager-that
Bahnmaier had admitted to a violation of the Substance Use Policy. A hospital does not
act unreasonably or arbitrarily when it acts in the interest of its heart surgery patients to
protect them from technicians who acknowledge intoxication at work. Additionally, the
fact that Bahnmaier was not drug tested prior to the termination of her employment does
not give rise to a cause of action for breach of an implied-in-fact contract based on the

•

Hospital's Substance Use Policy. This policy is not a contract and, in any event, does not
require drug testing. The policy leaves that choice to the discretion of the Hospital.
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The district court's summary judgment on Bahnmaier's claim for breach of the
implied-in-law covenant of good faith and fair dealing was not challenged in
Bahnmaier' s opening brief and should be affirmed for that reason.
The economic loss rule stands as a total bar to Bahnmaier' s negligence claim,
which is premised on duties found only in her alleged contracts.

Thus, because

Bahnmaier does not allege any property damage or bodily harm, the district court's grant
of summary judgment on her negligence claim was also correct.
Finally, the defamation and interference-with-contract claims were also correctly
subject to summary judgment based on the undisputed facts. Ultimately, Bahnm~ier
cannot escape her admission that she could have made a remark to Rytting that left
Rytting with the impression that she would fail a drug test. In the face of this admission,
no reasonable jury could believe that Rytting knowingly made a false report about
Bahnmaier or that Rytting otherwise acted with a reckless disregard for the truth. In any
event, Bahnmaier failed to adduce facts showing that Rytting abused the qualified
privilege that attaches to her statement. As a result, the district court correctly granted
summary judgment on the defamation claim against Rytting.
For all of these reasons, the Hospital and Rytting request that the district court's
order granting summary judgment against the claims in Bahnmaier' s Complaint be
affirmed.
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